THE A-B-CS OF TARGETING: A FORMULA FOR RESOLVING PERSONAL JURISDICTION-INTERNET ISSUES WITHIN THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS by Olin, Nathan A.
Western New England Law Review
Volume 23 23 (2001-2002)
Issue 2 Article 1
1-1-2002
THE A-B-CS OF TARGETING: A FORMULA
FOR RESOLVING PERSONAL
JURISDICTION-INTERNET ISSUES WITHIN
THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
Nathan A. Olin
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/lawreview
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Review & Student Publications at Digital Commons @ Western New England
University School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Western New England Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons
@ Western New England University School of Law. For more information, please contact pnewcombe@law.wne.edu.
Recommended Citation
Nathan A. Olin, THE A-B-CS OF TARGETING: A FORMULA FOR RESOLVING PERSONAL JURISDICTION-INTERNET
ISSUES WITHIN THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS, 23 W. New Eng. L. Rev. 237 (2002),
http://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/lawreview/vol23/iss2/1
Volume 23 
WESTERN NEW ENGLAND Issue 2 
LAW REVIEW 2002 
THE A-B-CS OF TARGETING: A FORMULA 









NATHAN A. OLIN* 
INTRODUCTION 
If the Internet is an explosion, we are living smack-dab in the 
middle of the mushroom cloud. In less than four years, there will 
be over 765 million Internet users.1 By 2003, consumer e-com­
merce revenues could approach $150 billion and annual business­
to-business e-commerce revenues could reach $2.8 trillion.2 At pre­
sent, more than five million e-mail messages are sent around the 
* The author, a former litigator at Robinson & Cole LLP in Hartford, Connecti­
cut, is law clerk to United States Magistrate Judge Kenneth P. Neiman of the United 
States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. The views expressed in this 
article are entirely the author's own. 
1. Am. Bar Ass'n Global Cyberspace Jurisdiction Project, Achieving Legal and 
Business Order in Cyberspace: A Report on Global Jurisdiction Issues Created by the 
Internet 4 (July 10, 2000), at http://www.abanet.orgibuslaw/cyber/initiatives/draft.rtf 
[hereinafter Global Cyberspace Jurisdiction Report] (citing Europe and Asia Play 
Catch-up with the U.S. (Jan. 11, 2000), at http://www.e-land.com/estats/ 
011100_ wwinternetuse.html). 
2. Id. (citing Boston Consulting Group & Shop.org, New BCG Study Re-Evalu­
ates Size, Growth and Importance of Business- To-Business E-Commerce (Dec. 21, 
1999), and Vanessa Hua, E-Shopping: Online Predictions; Despite Huge States, Net Sales 
Estimates No More Than Educated Guess, EXAMINER, Dec. 6, 1999). 
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world each minute.3 Indeed, cybergrowth has been compared to 
bacterial replication and rabbit ·procreation.4 
Just as the Internet boom has impacted nearly every aspect of 
daily life, it has also affected traditional, property-based law. The 
growing pains associated with this exponential legal transformation 
have prompted one court to observe that applying established legal 
concepts to cyberspace "is somewhat like trying to board a moving 
bus."5 Within the District of Massachusetts, Judge Nancy Gertner 
puts it this way: 
To paraphrase Gertrude Stein, as far as the Internet is concerned, 
not only is there perhaps "no there there," the "there" is every­
where where there is Internet access. When business is transacted 
over a computer net~ork via a Web-site accessed by a computer 
in Massachusetts, it takes place as much in Massachusetts, liter­
ally or figuratively, as it does anywhere.6 . 
Civil procedure in general, and the doctrine of personal juris­
diction in particular, is no exception. Thus, it is no coincidence that, 
in recent years, the variety of lower federal courts that have tried to 
apply familiar personal jurisdictional principles to a new computer­
ized world have often reached inconsistent results.7 The United 
3. Id. at 3 (citing Carleton Foirina, The Communications Revolution, in COM­
MONWEALTH CLUB OF CALIFORNIA MONTHLY NEWSLETrER, July 19, 1999, available at 
http://www.commonwealthclub.org). 
4. Id. at 2. 
5. Bensusan Rest. Corp. v. King, 126 F.3d 25, 27 (2d Cir. 1997). 
6. Digital Equip. Corp. v. Altavista Tech., Inc., 960 F. Supp. 456, 462 (D. Mass. 
1997); see also Hasbro, Inc. v. Clue Computing, Inc., 994 F. Supp. 34, 37 (D. Mass. 1997) 
(noting that "[t]he explosive growth 'of the Internet has sparked new debates in the law" 
and that "'Cyberspace' poses new issues regarding copyrights and Internet sites, First 
Amendment inquiries, trademark, and personal jurisdiction issues"). 
7. Compare, e.g., Inset Sys., Inc. v. Instruction Set, 937 F. Supp. 161, 166 (D. 
Conn. 1996) (exercising personal jurisdiction in Connecticut over Massachusetts defen­
dant that did littl!! more than establish passive web-site), with Bensusan Rest: Corp. v. 
King, 937 F. Supp. 295, 301 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) ("[c]reating a [web-]site, like placing a 
product into the stream of commerce, may be felt nationwide-or even worldwide-but, 
without more, it is not an act purposefully directed toward the forum state"), affd, 126 
F.3d 25 (2d Cir. 1997). See also Telco Communications v. An Apple A Day, 977 F. 
Supp. 404,406 (E.D. Va. 1997) (observing that Bensusan and Inset reached opposite 
holdings "[o]n nearly identical facts"); Robert W. Hamilton & Gregory A. Castanias, 
Tangled Web: Personal Jurisdiction and the Internet, 24 No.2 LITIG. 27, 34 (1998) (not­
ing that many courts other than Inset and Bensusan "recently have rendered personal­
jurisdiction decisions involving the Internet, and they weave a tangled web"); Dale M. 
Cendali & Rebecca L. Weinstein, Personal Jurisdiction and the Internet, in SECOND 
ANN. INTERNET L. INST., 975, 989-90 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks and Liter­
ary Property Course Handbook Series No. 60-0001, 1998) (contrasting inconsistent 
holdings). 
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States Supreme Court-which was not shy in discussing personal 
jurisdiction in the decade immediately preceding the Internet ex­
plosion-has yet to weigh in on the current debate, as does the First 
Circui~ Court of Appeals. 
This Article examines traditional concepts of personal jurisdic­
tion, as applied within the federal courts, in relation to cyberspace. 
Central to the discussion are three Supreme Court opinions: (1) 
AsahiMetal Industry Co. v. Superior Court,8 the Court's most re­
cent, in-depth personal jurisdictional foray, in which a plurality of 
the Court found that the "placement of a product into the stream of 
commerce, without more, is not an act of the defendant purpose­
fully directed toward the forum State"; (2) Burger King Corp. v. 
Rudzewicz ,9 in which the Court analyzed personal jurisdiction is­
sues in the context of contractual breaches; and (3) Calder v. 
Jones,lO in which the Court looked at personal jurisdiction through 
the lens of intentional conduct. These three cases-Asahi, Burger 
King, and Calder-.provlde a simple A-B-C formula for resolving 
nearly every personal jurisdiction-Internet dispute within the Dis­
trict of Massachusetts. This foundation is based principally on a 
defendant's targeting, or purposefully directing, his or her actions at 
the forum state. 
Part I of this Article sets forth the legal framework in which 
the personal jurisdiction-Internet dispute arises. Specifically, Part I 
provides a personal jurisdiction primer and discusses the Supreme 
Court's A-B-C trilogy. Part II analyzes the personal jurisdiction­
Internet paradigm and comments on several related legal concepts. 
Part III discusses how personal jurisdiction-Internet disputes have 
been resolved thus far in the District of Massachusetts. 
I. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
It is helpful to begin by describing several fundamental per­
sonal jurisdiction concepts. The discussion will then turn to the Su­
preme Court's A-B-C trilogy: Asahi, Burger King, and Calder. 
A. Personal Jurisdiction Primer 
Among the basic concepts in the area of personal jurisdiction 
are the following: the issue of general, versus the more common 
specific, jurisdiction; the requirement that jurisdiction over a non­
8. 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987). 
9. 471 U.S. 462, 463 (1985). 
10. 465 U.S. 783, 791 (1984). 
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resident comport with the long-arm statute of the forum state; and 
the application of a sophisticated due process inquiry.u Each of 
these concepts is highly relevant to the application of personal juris­
diction in cyberspace. 
1. General vs. Specific Jurisdiction 
A fundamental concept in the personal jurisdiction inquiry is 
the distinction between "general" and "specific" jurisdiction. 
Briefly, general jurisdiction requires that a defendant has such 
"continuous and systematic" contacts with a forum that he is sub­
ject to personal jurisdiction in that state for just about any action 
that can be brought against him.12 Specific jurisdiction, on the 
other hand, may be established only if the specific cause of action 
arises out of the forum related activityP 
A good example of what has traditionally been required to es­
tablish general jurisdiction can be found in the Supreme Court's 
1952 decision, Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining CO.14 In 
Perkins, the Court upheld an Ohio court's assertion of general juris­
diction over a Philippine company, finding that the president of the 
company had maintained an office in Ohio from which he con­
ducted activities on behalf of the corporation, kept company files, 
held directors' meetings, and carried on correspondence relating to 
the business.15 The Court also found that the president had distrib­
uted salary checks drawn on two active Ohio bank accounts, en­
gaged an Ohio bank to act as transfer agent, and while in Ohio, 
"supervised policies dealing with the rehabilitation of the corpora­
tion's properties in the Philippines."16 "In short, the foreign corpo­
ration, through its president, 'had been carrying on in Ohio a 
continuous and systematic;but limited, part of its general business,' 
and the exercise of general jurisdiction over the Philippine corpora­
tion by [the] Ohio court was 'reasonable and juSt."'17 
At the other extreme in the traditional analysis, the Supreme 
11. See Noonan v. Winston Co., 135 F.3d 85, 89 (1st Cir. 1998) (citing, inter alia, 
Helicopteros Nacionales deColombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414-16 (1984». 
12. See Phillips Exeter Acad. v. Howard Phillips Fund, Inc., 196 F.3d 284, 288 (1st 
Cir. 1999). 
13. See id. (applying a three-part test in determining whether the claim arises out 
of the forum-related activity). 
14. 342 U.S. 437 (1952). 
15. Id. at 447-48. 
16. Id. at 448. 
17. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 415 (1984) 
(quoting Perkins, 342 U.S. at 438, 445). 
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Court has found an absence of general jurisdiction in Texas over a 
foreign company where the contacts of the company were limited.18 
The company's chief executive officer attended contract negotia­
tions in Texas, and the company accepted checks drawn on a Texas 
bank, purchased expensive equipment and training services from a 
Texas company, and sent personnel to Texas for training.19 At best, 
therefore, the Texas courts could only attempt to assert specific ju­
risdiction over the foreign defendant, an issue the Supreme Court 
did not reach.20 
Although the issue of general (versus specific) jurisdiction is 
often analyzed under the due process inquiry, it is relevant now 
since the courts have almost universally rejected the argument that 
merely entering cyberspace by putting up a web-site permits gen­
eral jurisdiction over the site creator.21 There is, however, at least 
one possible exception. In Mieczkowski v. Masco Corp. ,22 the court 
held that an interactive web-site that responds to consumer product 
inquiries, coupled with the defendant's "traditional business con­
tacts" with Texas, establishes general jurisdiction.23 Mieczkowski, 
however, has been distinguished24 and criticized25 by courts and re­
jected by at least one commentator.26 
2. Long-Arm Statutes 
As every law student knows by January of the first year, to 
establish personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant, the 
18. See id. at 418 n.12. 
19. Id. at 416. 
20. See id. at 418 n.12 (noting that there was no assertion of specific jurisdiction). 
21. See, e.g., Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta Nat'l, Inc., 223 F.3d 1082, 1086 
(9th Cir. 2000); Soma Med. Int'l v. Standard Chartered Bank, 196 F.3d 1292, 1297 (10th 
Cir. 1999); Am. Eyewear, Inc. v. Peeper's Sunglasses & Accessories, Inc., 106 F. Supp. 
2d 895, 899 (N.D. Tex. 2000); Molnlycke Health Care AB v. Dumex Med. Surgical 
Prods. Ltd., 64 F. Supp. 2d 448, 451 (E.D. Pa. 1999). 
22. 997 F. Supp. 782 (E.D. Tex. 1998). 
23. Id. at 788 (noting that the greater "level of interactivity" makes it more than 
just a passive site). 
24. See, e.g., ESAB Group, Inc. v. Centricut, LLC, 34 F. Supp. 2d 323, 330-31 
(D.S.C. 1999) (distinguishing Mieczkowski and holding that "[g]eneral in personam ju­
risdiction must be based on more than a defendant's mere presence on the Internet 
even if it is an 'Interactive' presence"). 
25. See Coastal Video Communications Corp. v. Staywell Corp., 59 F. Supp. 2d 
562, 571 (E.D. Va. 1999) (indicating that distinguishing Mieczkowski and its general 
jurisdiction analysis "is not complete"). 
26. See Howard B. Stravitz, Personal Jurisdiction in Cyberspace: Something More 
Is Required on the Electronic Stream of Commerce, 49 S.c. L. REv. 925, 934 (1998) 
(noting that Mieczkowski is the "one notable exception" to the no general jurisdiction 
rule). 
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plaintiff has the burden of proving that the defendant's conduct sat­
isfies two things: (1) the applicable long-arm statute and (2) the due 
process requirements of the United States Constitution.27 A so­
phisticated long-arm statute analysis can often make or break a 
Rule 12(b )(2) motion to dismiss. 
Essentially, there are two types of long-arm statutes.28 Statutes 
in states such as New Jersey, Arizona, and Missouri have been in­
terpreted to allow the exercise of personal jurisdiction to the full 
extent permitted by the due process c1ause.29 Other states such as 
Connecticut and New York, are more micro-managerial.3° Their 
long-arm statutes define specific instances in which personal juris­
diction is properly exercised: for example, when the cause of action 
arises from the defendant's transacting any business in the state, 
when the case derives from the asseition that the defendant caused 
tortious injury by acting within the state, or when the matter is tied 
to the defendant's having or owning real property in the state.31 In 
Massachusetts, the approximately 2SD-word long-arm statute fol­
lows the micro-managerial model: 
A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person, who 
acts directly or by an agent, as to a cause of action in law or 
equity arising from the person's 
(1) transacting any business in this commonwealth; 
(2) contracting to supply services or things in this commonwealth; 
(3) causing tortious injury by an act or omission in this com­
monwealth; . 
(4) causing tortious injury in this commonwealth by an act or 
omission outside this commonwealth if he regularly does or solic­
its business, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, 
27. Sawtelle v. Farrell, 70.F.3d 1381, 1387 (1st Cir. 1995). 
28. See, e.g., Cent. Pa. Teamsters Pension Fund v. Burten, 634 F. Supp. 128, 130 
(E.D. Pa. 1986); Michael 1. Dunne & Anna L. Musacchio, Jurisdiction over the Internet, 
54 Bus. LAW. 385, 387-88 (1998). 
29. See, e.g., Imo Indus., Inc. v; Kiekert AG, 155 F.3d 254, 259 (3d Cir. 1998) 
(indicating that "New lersey['s] long-arm statute permits the exercise of personal juris­
diction to the fullest limits of due process"); Doe v. Am. Nat'l Red Cross, 112 F.3d 
1048, 1050 (9th Cir. 1997) ("The Arizona long-arm statute provides for personal juris­
diction co-extensive with the limits of federal due process."); Portnoy v. Defiance, Inc., 
951 F.2d 169, 171 (8th Cir. 1991) (noting that Missouri's "statutory language was in­
tended to provide for jurisdiction within the specific categories enumerated in the stat­
ute, to the full extent permitted by the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment") (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
30. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. 52-59b (2001); N.Y. c.P.L.R. 302 (McKinney 
2001). 
31. See CONN. GEN. STAT. 52-59b (2001); N.Y. C.PLR. 302 (McKinney 2001); 
see also Dunne & Musacchio, supra note 28, at 387-88. 
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or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or 
services rendered, in this commonwealth; 
(5) having an interest in, using or possessing real property in this 
commonwealth; , 
(6) contracting to insure any person, property or risk located 
within this commonwealth at the tiine of contracting; 
(7) maintaining a domicile in this commonwealth while a party to 
a personal or marital relationship out of which arises a claim for 
divorce, alimony, property settlement, parentage of a child, child 
support or child custody; or the commission of any act giving rise 
,to such a claim; or 
(8) having been subject to the exercise of personal jurisdiction of 
a court of the commonwealth which has resulted in an order of 
alimony, custody, child support or property settlement, notwith­
standing the subsequent departure of one of the original parties 
from the commonwealth, if the action involves modification of 
such order or orders and the moving party resides in the com­
monwealth, or if the action involves enforcement of such order 
notwithstanding the domicile of the moving party.32 
While many find the complex due process inquiry to raise the 
most interesting questions (even this Article focuses almost exclu­
sively on due process principles), long-arm statutes should not be 
overlooked. For example, in Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King,33 
an early Internet case discussed more fully below, the trial court 
determined that personal jurisdiction was improper under both the 
New York long-arm statute and the due process clause of the Four­
teenth Amendment.34 On appeal, the Second Circuit, while not dis­
counting the district court's "scholarly" due process analysis, 
affirmed the court's conclusion simply because the exercise of per­
sonal jurisdiction was proscribed by the statutory law of New 
York.35 
3. Due Process Inquiry 
In a specific jurisdiction case, the plaintiff has the burden of 
proving that the defendant's conduct, in addition to satisfying the 
state's long-arm statute, also comports with due process.36 Case law 
in the First Circuit breaks the due process inquiry into three 
elements: 
32. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 223A, § 3 (1998). 
33. 937 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). 
34. Id. at 299-30l. 
35. Bensusan Rest. Corp. v. King, 126 F.3d 25, 27 (2d Cir. 1997). 
36. See Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945). 
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First, an inquiring court must ask whether the claim that under­
girds the litigation directly relates to or arises out of the defen­
dant's contacts with the forum. Second, the court must ask 
whether those contacts constitute purposeful availment of the 
benefits and protections afforded by the forum's laws. Third, if 
the proponent's case clears the first two hurdles, the court then 
must analyze the overall reasonableness of an exercise of juris­
diction in light of a variety of pertinent factors that touch upon 
the fundamental fairness of an exercise of jurisdiction.37 
An affirmative resolution of each of the three elements is neces­
sary to support a finding of specific jurisdiction.38 
Initially, in a contract claim, the court asks "whether the defen­
dant's forum-based activities are instrumental in the formation of 
the contract" or, in a tort claim, "whether the plaintiff has estab­
lished cause in fact ... and legal cause ...."39 At a later stage of 
the inquiry, the court must analyze certain "Gestalt" factors: the 
burden on the defendant in appearing; the interest of the forum 
state in adjudicating the dispute; the interest of the plaintiff in ob­
taining convenient and effective relief; the interest of the judicial 
system in obtaining the most effective resolution of the controversy; 
and the common interests of all sovereigns in the promotion of sub­
stantive social policies.40 
It is a portion of the second stage of analysis-the purposeful­
ness of the defendant's conduct-that has much resonance in the 
Internet arena. In the First Circuit's vernacular, the court must ask 
whether the defendant's web-based contacts (perhaps among other 
37. Phillips Exeter Acad. v. Howard Phillips Fund, Inc., 196 F.3d 284, 288 (1st 
Cir. 1999). Other circuits often collapse the inquiry into two components. See, e.g., 
Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 99 (2d Cir. 2000) ("The required due 
process inquiry itself has two parts: whether a defendant has minimum contacts with the 
forum state and whether ... the exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable under the circum­
stances of a particular case.") (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); Imo In­
dus., Inc. v. Kiekert AG, 155 F.3d 254, 259 (3d Cir. 1999) (similar); see also Brown v. 
Slenker, 220 F.3d 411,417 (5th Cir. 2000) ("The Due Process Clause permits the exer­
cise of personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant if: 1) that defendant has 
minimum contacts with the forum state; and 2) the exercise of jurisdiction does not 
offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.") (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
38. Phillips Exeter Acad., 196 F.3d at 288; see also id. at 288 n.l ("[T]he relative 
strength or weakness of the plaintiffs showing on the first two elements bears upon the 
third element (the overall fairness of an exercise of jurisdiction)."). 
39. Mass. Sch. of Law at Andover, Inc. v. Am. Bar Ass'n, 142 F.3d 26, 35 (1st Cir. 
1998) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
40. See United Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers v. 163 Pleasant St. Corp., 960 F.2d 
1080, 1088 (1st Cir. 1992). 
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traditional contacts) "constitute purposeful availment of the bene­
fits and protections afforded by the forum's laws. "41 Asked another 
way, did the defendant, through his Internet activity, intend to tar­
get the foreign state? 
B. The Supreme Court's A-B-Cs 
Knowledge of a trilogy of Supreme Court cases from the 1980s 
is essential to resolving current personal jurisdiction-Internet dis­
putes. These three cases are referred to herein, in reverse chrono­
logical order, as the A-B-Cs: Asahi Metal Industries Co. v. Superior 
Court,42 Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz,43 and Calder v. Jones.44 
Each of these cases, to a certain extent, focuses on the purposeful­
ness component of the due process inquiry; they ask to what extent 
has the defendant targeted the forum state? Before specifically an­
alyzing these cases, however, it is necessary to discuss purposeful 
availment further. 
1. Purposeful Availment 
Modern notions of personal jurisdiction begin with Interna­
tional Shoe Co. v. State ofWashington45 which established the "min­
imum contacts" test.46 In Hanson v. Denckla,47 the Court 
supplemented International Shoe by holding that an act "by which 
the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of con­
ducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits 
and protections of its laws," is also necessary to the due process 
inquiry.48 Two decades later, in Kulko v. Superior Court,49 the 
41. Philips Exeter Acad., 196 F.3d at 288. 
42. 480 U.S. 102 (1987). 
43. 471 U.S. 462 (1985). 
44. 465 U.S. 783 (1984). 
45. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
46. Id. at 316. Historically, a court's in personam jurisdiction power was 
"grounded on [its] de facto power over the defendant's person" and, therefore, the 
defendant's "presence within the territorial jurisdiction of a court was prerequisite to its 
rendition of a judgment personally binding him." Id. (citing Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 
714,733 (1877)). In International Shoe, however, the Court recognized that the capias 
ad respondendum had given way to personal service of summonses or other form of 
notice. Thus, the Court held that "due process requires only that in order to subject a 
defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the 
forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit 
does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." Id. (citations 
and internal quotation marks omitted). 
47. 357 U.S. 235 (1958). 
48. Id. at 253 (citing Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310,319 (1945)). 
49. 436 U.S. 84 (1978). 
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Court reinforced Hanson, applying again a "purposeful availment" 
test as a standard for fulfilling minimum contacts.50 
In Kulko, the plaintiff was a California mother who sought to 
increase child support payments from the defendant-father who 
lived in New York.51 Finding that the "purposeful availment" test 
should be limited to wrongful activity causing injury in the forum 
state (California), the Court held that the father, who merely "al­
low[ ed] [his children] to spend more time in California than was 
required under a separation agreement[,] can hardly be said to have 
'purposefully availed himself' of the 'benefits and protections' of 
California's laws."52 In other words, it was not the defendant, but 
the plaintiff, who had targeted California. 
A few years after Kulko, the Court continued the process of 
the "purposeful availment" analysis. In World-Wide Volkswagen 
Corp. v. Woodson,53 the Court held that a New York automobile 
retailer and wholesaler could not be haled into an Oklahoma court 
in a products liability case involving one of its cars.54 Justice 
White's majority opinion stated that it is "critical" to any due pro­
cess analysis 
that the defendant's conduct and connection with the forum 
State are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled 
into court there .... The Due Process Clause, by ensuring the 
"orderly administration of the laws," ... gives a degree of pre­
dictability to the legal system that allows potential defendants to 
structure their primary conduct with some minimum assurance as 
to where that conduct will and will not render them liable to suit. 
When a corporation "purposefully avails itself of the privi­
lege of conducting activities within the forum State," ... it has 
clear notice that it is subject to suit there ....55 
Clearly, the "purposeful availment," or targeting, prong of the 
due process inquiry, is "alive and well."56 In this respect, the First 
Circuit's separation of purposeful availment from the other prongs 
of the inquiry-as compared with other jurisdictions which collapse 
50. See 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRAcnCE 
AND PROCEDURE § 1067 (2d ed. 1987). 
51. 436 U.S. at 86-88. 
52. Id. at 94. 
53. 444 U.S. 286 (1980). 
54. Id. at 295. 
55. Id. at 297 (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) (citations 
omitted». 
56. Welinsky v. Resort of the World D.N.v., 839 F.2d 928, 930 (2d Cir. 1988). 
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the analysis57-makes eminent sense. 
2. Asahi: Stream of Commerce 
The "A" case in this targeting triumvirate, Asahi Metal Indus­
try Co. v. Superior Court,58 is the Supreme Court's famous "stream 
of commerce" decision.59 Asahi concerned an indemnification dis­
pute between a Taiwanese tire company (Cheng Shin) and a Japa­
nese tire valve manufacturer (AsahO that was residual to a product 
liability action initiated in a California court and later settled in 
other respects.60 The Supreme Court reversed the California state 
court judgment holding that California had jurisdiction over Cheng 
Shin's claim against Asahi.61 Asahi's only contact with California 
was selling tire valves to Cheng Shin in Taiwan, followed by Cheng 
Shin's inserting some of the Asahi valves into tires it sold in Califor­
nia.62 The sales alleged in Asahi were numerous and continuing.63 
Justice O'Connor, delivering the judgmerit of the unanimous 
Court, found that California's exercise of jurisdiction over Cheng 
Shin's claim against Asahi was beyond the limits of the due process 
clause.64 In one part of the opinion, Justice O'Connor, speaking for 
a plurality of four-herself, Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Powell, 
and Justice Scalia-stated that 
[t]he placement of a product into the stream of commerce, with­
out more, is not an act of the defendant purposefully directed 
toward the forum State .... [A] defendant's awareness that the 
stream of commerce mayor will sweep the product into the fo­
rum State, does not convert the mere act of placing the product 
into the stream into an act purposefully directed toward the fo­
rum State.65 
Accordingly, because Asahi's only "contact" with California 
57. See supra note 37 and accompanying text for a description of the First Cir­
cuit's analysis. 
58. 480 U.S. 102 (1987). 
59. "Stream of commerce" principles were actually first formulated by the Illinois 
Supreme Court in Gray v. Am. Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 176 N.E.2d 761, 
766 (Ill. 1961), and further analyzed by the Supreme Court in World-Wide Volkswagen 
Corp., 444 U.S. at 297-98. 
60. 480 U.S. at 105-06. 
61. Id. at 108. 
62. Id. at 106. 
63. See, e.g., Boit v. Gar-Tee Prods., Inc., 967 F.2d 671, 682-83 (1st Cir. 1992) 
(explaining Asahi). 
64. See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 115-16. 
65. Id. at 112. 
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was its awareness that Cheng Shin sold tires with Asahi valves to 
consumers in California, Asahi did not purposefully establish any 
contacts in California such that it should have reasonably antici­
pated being haled into court in that state.66 
Justice O'Connor gave some examples of the "something 
more" that would constitute a purposeful direction of action into a 
forum state: designing a product for a particular state's market; ad­
vertising; establishing channels for advice to customers in the state; 
or using a distributor as a sales agent in the forum.67 However, as 
the recent Global Cyberspace Jurisdiction Project report points out, 
"[i]ntuitively, it would seem unlikely that many parts manufacturers 
would engage in such conduct."68 Even so, it was clear to Justice 
O'Connor that activity must be purposefully directed toward the fo­
rum in order to confer jurisdiction on a potential defendant.69 Sev­
eral circuits, including the First Circuit, have squarely addressed the 
stream-of-commerce issue since Asahi and adopted Justice 
O'Connor's plurality view.70 
3. Burger King: Contractual Issues 
Purposeful direction was also at the center of the "B" case in 
the trilogy. In Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz ,71 the defendant, a 
Michigan businessman (Rudzewicz), had allegedly breached his 
franchise agreement with the corporation.72 The corporation, 
therefore, sued Rudzewicz in Florida even though he had not been 
66. See id. at 112-13. 
67. Id. at 111-12. 
68. Global Cyberspace Jurisdiction Report, supra note 1, at 45. 
69. Asahi, 480 u.s. at 112. Another four Justices, Brennan, White, Marshall, and 
Blackmun, disagreed, stating that placing a product into the stream of commerce is a 
purposeful act directed at the forum state as long as the defendant is aware the product 
is being marketed in the forum state. Id. at 116-17 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part 
and concurring in the judgment). Justice Stevens, joined by White and Blackmun, rea­
soned, in a concurring opinion, that placing a product into the stream of commerce may 
rise to the level of a purposeful availment depending on the volume, value, and hazard­
ous character of the product. Id. at 122 (Stevens, J., concurring); see also Boit v. Gar­
Tec Prods., Inc., 967 F.2d 671, 682-83 (1st Cir. 1992); Benitez-Allende v. Alcan 
Aluminio Do Brasil, S.A., 857 F.2d 26, 29-30 (1st Cir. 1988) (both explaining the Asahi 
opinion). 
70. See Madara v. Hall, 916 F.2d 1510, 1516-17 (11th Cir. 1990); Falkirk Mining 
Co. v. Japan Steel Works, Ltd., 906 F.2d 369, 375-76 (8th Cir. 1990); cf Keds Corp. v. 
Renee Int'l Trading Corp., 888 F.2d 215, 220 (1st Cir. 1989); Hugel v. McNeil, 886 F.2d 
1, 4 (1st Cir. 1989). 
71. 471 U.S. 462 (1985). 
72. Id. at 468-69. Burger King, the national hamburger chain, is headquartered in 
Miami. Id. at 464. 
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present in Florida in any jurisdictionally significant wayJ3 The 
Court, siding with the corporation, agreed that Rudzewicz had pur­
posefully availed himself of the privilege of conducting activities in 
Florida.74 According to the Court, "[s]o long as a commercial ac­
tor's efforts are 'purposefully directed' toward residents of another 
State, we have consistently rejected the notion that an absence of 
physical contacts can defeat personal jurisdiction there."75 
The Court's determination in Burger King was based on a vari­
ety of factors: Rudzewicz was a sophisticated businessman; the con­
tract was long-term, of high value, and closely supervised; 
Rudzewicz had himself solicited the franchise and actively negoti­
ated the contract's terms; the contract had a choice of Florida law 
provision; and Rudzewicz's payments under the contract-the 
center of the dispute-were to be sent to MiarniJ6 As in Asahi, the 
theme underlying these factors was that Rudzewicz had targeted 
Florida; therefore, purposefully availing himself of that state's 
lawsJ7 
4. Calder: Intentional Effects 
The third case in the trilogy, the "c" case, is Calder v. Jones.78 
Like Burger King and Asahi, Calder too focuses on "intentional" 
conduct, the purposefulness component of the due process in­
quiry.79 Calder was a libel action brought by the California actress, 
Shirley Jones, against the editor and an author of the National En­
quirer, neither of whom had been in California in any meaningful 
way.80 Critical to the Court's finding that personal jurisdiction over 
these two individuals was indeed warranted were two things: (1) the 
story focused on California, the center of Jones' life and Hollywood 
career; and (2) all aspects of the defendants' alleged conduct (writ­
ing, editing and, ultimately, libeling) were intentional acts targeting 
a California resident.81 Thus, the Court held that it was reasonable 
for the defendants to "anticipate being haled into court there to 
73. See Global Cyberspace Jurisdiction Report, supra note 1, at 53 (discussing 
Burger King). 
74. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 482. 
75. Id. at 476. 
76. Id. at 478-82, 485. 
77. See id. at 482. 
78. 465 U.S. 783 (1984). 
79. See id. at 789. 
80. Id. at 784-86; see also Global Cyberspace Jurisdiction Report, supra note 1, at 
49 (discussing Calder). 
81. See Calder, 465 U.S. at 789-90. 
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answer for the truth of [their] statements."82 
II. PERSONAL JURISDICTION ENTERS THE CYBER-AGE 
This section of the Article will analyze some early attempts to 
resolve thorny personal jurisdiction-Internet issues and comment 
on several related legal concepts. Throughout, analogy will be 
made to the targeting framework. 
A. Early Personal Jurisdiction-Internet Decisions 
Because the Internet has shattered many traditional concepts 
of space, the legal system has been forced, for better or worse, to 
formulate new working jurisdictional rules. Absent legislative ac­
tion, responsibility for this formulation has fallen largely on the 
courtS.83 Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King84 and Zippo Manufac­
turing Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc. 85 represent two initial judicial 
attempts at this task. In both cases, the courts looked principally at 
the complexity of the defendant's web-sites. While subsequent 
cases have followed Zippo and Bensusan's analyses, the courts are 
increasingly looking to the targeting of the forum state in accor­
dance with the A-B-C trilogy previously discussed.86 
1. Bensusan 
In Bensusan,87 the Second Circuit upheld the trial court's de­
termination that the operator of a "small" Missouri jazz club named 
"The Blue Note" could not be sued for trademark infringement in 
New York by the famous Manhattan club of the same' name solely 
because the defendant had established an Internet web-site linking 
the two entities.88 According to the trial court, "[c]reating a site, 
like placing a product into the stream of commerce, may be felt 
82. [d. at 790. 
83. However, the recent Global Cyberspace Jurisdiction Report recommends a 
set of basic default rules, described below, that might serve as a legislative foundation of 
a fair system of jurisdictional jurisprudence for cyberspace commerce. Global Cyber­
space Jurisdiction Report, supra note 1, at 18-26; see Legal Experts Call for Global Com­
mission to Resolve E-Commerce Jurisdiction Issues, 69 U.S.L. WK. 2048 (July 18, 2000) 
(describing the Global Cyberspace Jurisdiction Report). Also, Congress has enacted a 
statute dealing with certain in rem "cybersquatting" issues. See discussion infra Part 
Il.B.2. 
84. 937 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), affd, 126 F.3d 25 (2d Cir. 1997). 
85. 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997). 
86. See supra Part LB. 
87. 126 F.3d 25 (2d Cir. 1997). 
88. [d. at 29. 
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nationwide-or even worldwide-but, without more, it is not an act 
purposefully directed toward the forum state."89 The Missouri club 
owner did not target New York, the court found, since information 
on the web-site described a distinctly Missouri connection.90 
2. Zippo: Look to the Web-Site 
In Zippo, the plaintiff was a Pennsylvania manufacturer of the 
well known "Zippo" tobacco lighters.91 It sued the defendant-a 
California Internet news service provider operating under the name 
of "Zippo Dot Com, Inc."-in Pennsylvania for various violations 
of the Federal Trademark Act.92 According to the facts of the case, 
the defendant had, worldwide, about 140,000 paying subscribers to 
its news service, two percent of whom were from Pennsylvania.93 
The defendant had also entered into agreements with seven Penn­
sylvania Internet providers to permit their subscribers access to the 
defendant's news service.94 
The key to the court's resolution of the personal jurisdiction 
inquiry was the quantum of interactivity the defendant's web-site 
offered. The court was almost mathematical in its analysis. Ac­
cording to Judge Sean McLaughlin, "the likelihood that personal 
jurisdiction can be constitutionally exercised is directly proportion­
ate to the nature and quality of commercial activity that an entity 
conducts over the Internet."95 The three-part "sliding scale" of in­
teraction established by Zippo was expressed as follows: 
At one end of the spectrum are situations where a defendant 
. clearly does business over the Internet. If the defendant enters 
into contracts with residents of a foreign jurisdiction that involve 
the knowing and repeated transmission of computer files over 
the Internet, personal jurisdiction is proper. At the opposite end 
are situations where a defendant has simply posted information 
on an Internet Web site which is accessible to users in foreign 
jurisdictions. A passive Web site that does little more than make 
information available to those who are interested in it is not 
grounds for the exercise [of] personal jurisdiction. The middle 
ground is occupied by interactive Web sites where a user can ex­
change information with the host computer. In these cases, the 
89. Bensusan, 937 F. Supp. at 301. 
90. See id. 




95. Id. at 1124. 
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exercise of jurisdiction is determined by examining the level of 
interactivity and commercial nature of the exchange of informa­
tion that occurs on the Web site.96 
Based on this standard, the court found that the defendant in Zippo 
was "doing business over the Internet" and, thus, the exercise of 
jurisdiction over the defendant in Pennsylvania was proper.97 
3. A Return to Targeting 
To a large extent, Bensusan and Zippo reflect the A-B-C cases' 
focus on the purposefulness of the defendants' conduct. An indi­
vidual who intentionally targets a forum by entering into contracts 
with forum residents, such as Zippo, or electronically links itself to 
the plaintiff, as did Bensusan, is doing more to establish a tie to the 
forum than one who simply puts up a passive web-site. In this re­
spect, Zippo appropriately rejected Inset Systems, Inc. v. Instruction 
Set,98 a case where the court exercised personal jurisdiction over an 
out-of-state defendant whose contacts with the forum consisted 
only of posting a passive web-site-albeit one accessible to an esti­
mated 10,000 forum residents-and maintaining a toll-free tele­
phone number.99 
Still, Zippo and Bensusan are not without their critics. One 
team of commentators postulates, "[i]f, in order to avoid the risk of 
being haled into [every] court across the country, you must limit 
your company's use of the Web to simply a passive, static Website, 
then why bother?"IOO Others, too, have rejected a per se adherence 
to these cases' mathematical analyses.IOI 
96. Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
97. Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
98. 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 1996). 
99. See Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1125. Other courts, too, have specifically rejected 
the Inset analysis. See, e.g., JB Oxford Holdings, Inc. v. Net Trade, Inc., 76 F. Supp. 2d 
1363, 1367 (S.D. Fla. 1999); Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger, 1997 WL 97097, at *20 
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 1997); Fix My PC, L.L.C. v. N.F.N. Assocs., Inc., 48 F. Supp. 2d 640, 
644 (N.D. Tex. 1999); Rannoch, Inc. v. Rannoch Corp., 52 F. Supp. 2d 681, 686-87 (E.D. 
Va. 1999). As stated by a district judge in Oregon: "lacking in Inset . .. [is] the principle 
that a defendant must 'purposefully direct' its activities at or take 'deliberate action' in 
or create 'substantial connection' with the forum state so as to provide fair warning that 
such activities may subject defendant to jurisdiction in a distant forum." Millennium 
Enters., Inc. v. Millennium Music L.P., 33 F. Supp. 2d 907, 922 (D. Or. 1999). 
100. Robert W. Hamilton & Gregory A. Castanias, Tangled Web: Personal Juris­
diction and the Internet, 24 No.2 LITIG. 27, 34 (1998). 
101. See Digital Equip. Corp. v. Altavista Tech., Inc., 960 F. Supp. 456, 471 (D. 
Mass. 1997) (finding it "troubl[ing] ... to force corporations that do business over the 
Internet, precisely because it is cost-effective, to now factor in the potential costs of 
defending against litigation in each and every state"); Global Cyberspace Jurisdiction 
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There is, thankfully, a movement afoot to look deeper than the 
mere level of interactivity or passivity of a particular web-site. For 
example, in Millennium Enterprises, the court refused to conclude 
that the potential of doing business within a state via an interactive 
web-site constituted the actual doing of such business.102 In cases 
such as Millennium Enterprises, the focus is shifting more squarely 
to the targeting of forum residents actually undertaken, i.e., the de­
fendant's intent. Such a methodology gets back to Asahi, Burger 
King, and Calder's doctrinal roots.103 
Some cases in this movement have explicitly latched onto 
Asahi's stream of commerce language, particularly Justice 
O'Connor's admonition that "something more" than the mere 
placement of a product into the stream is required.104 Thus, in 
Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc. ,105 the court noted that the Florida 
defendant, although posting an essentially passive web-site alleg­
edly infringing on the Arizona plaintiff's trademark, had done es­
sentially no more than that: 
[It] did nothing to encourage people in Arizona to access its 
site, ... there [was] no evidence that any part of its business ... 
was sought or achieved in Arizona .... [I]t entered into no con­
tracts in Arizona, made no sales in Arizona, received no tele­
phone calls from Arizona, earned no income from Arizona, and 
sent no messages over the Internet to Arizona.106 
Report, supra note 1, at 60 ("If each web site subjected its sponsor to global jurisdiction, 
many would forego use of the technology for fear of its secondary costs."); cf. id. at 63 
(noting that, because of Zippo, courts have become "clearly ... convinced that the 
nature of a defendant's web site is relevant to the jurisdictional issue, but a failure to 
articulate why it is relevant makes it difficult to determine where the jurisdictional line 
should be drawn in cases that fall between Zippo's two extremes"). 
102. See Millenium Enters., Inc., 33 F. Supp. 2d at 922. 
103. See Rothschild Berry Farm v. Serendipity Group L.L.c., 84 F. Supp. 2d 904, 
910 (S.D. Ohio 1999) (holding that an interactive site not used by forum residents was 
insufficient to sustain personal jurisdiction); Global Cyberspace Jurisdiction Report, 
supra note 1, at 65 ("Reliance ... on the nature of the web site alone is misplaced. If an 
interactive site is not targeted to a specific forum, courts should focus on how the site is 
actually used.") (footnote omitted). 
104. See, e.g., Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1322 (9th CiT. 
1998) (using the "something more" analysis); S. Morantz, Inc. v. Hang & Shine Ul­
trasonics, Inc., 79 F. Supp. 2d 537,540 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (using the "something more" 
analysis); Rothschild Berry Farm, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 910; Fix My PC, L.L.c. v. N.F.N. 
Assocs., Inc., 48 F. Supp. 2d 640, 642-43 (N.D. Tex. 1999) (using the "something more" 
analysis). 
105. 130 F.3d 414 (9th CiT. 1997). 
106. !d. at 419; see also Bensusan Rest. Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295, 301 
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (citing Asahi plurality). 
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Other courts that have also attempted to limn the "something 
more" that might be required under Asahi, however, have met with 
varying resuits.l07 One commentator has argued that the 
"hodgepodge" of district court decisions on this point "is inconsis­
tent, irrational, and irreconcilable."lo8 While the author does not 
hold such a bleak view, the point is well taken; more uniform direc­
tion from either the courts of appeal or Congress is needed. In­
deed, as the Global Cyberspace Jurisdiction Project report points 
out: 
The difficulty with the application of the stream of commerce 
doctrine in Cyberspace is that the theory is designed to deal with 
jurisdictional issues in a very particularized context, claims of in­
jury caused by the negligence of a parts manufacturer .... The 
theory ... is not relevant when ... the claim is that the defendant 
infringed the plaintiff's trademark, a claim analogous to the com­
mission of an intentional tort from which the defendant derives 
no economic benefit.lo9 
In short, reliance on Asahi alone, while useful, is not the complete 
answer. 
To be sure, Burger King's focus on intentional affiliation helps, 
and one court of appeals has, at least implicitly, followed Burger 
King's path. l1O In CompuServe, an Ohio computer information ser­
vice (CompuServe) sued a Texas marketer of software (Patterson) 
in Ohio.111 The suit sought a declaratory judgment as to the appli­
cability of a "Shareware Registration Agreement" the parties had 
mutually entered into.Hz The agreement, which called for the ap­
plication of Ohio law, allowed Patterson to place his software on 
107. Compare Fix My PC, L.L.c., 48 F. SUpp. 2d at 644 (finding web-site plus 
toll-free number and anecdotal evidence that plaintiff's customers mistakenly called de­
fendant not enough to establish personal jurisdiction), with Heroes, Inc. v. Heroes 
Found., 958 F. SUpp. 1,4-5 (D.D.C. 1996) (reasoning that web-site plus toll-free number 
and solicitations sufficient to establish purposeful availment), and Cybersell, Inc., 130 
F.3d at 418-19 (describing "something more" as having toll-free number, entering into 
contracts in the forum, and selling goods in the forum). 
108. Stravitz, supra note 26, at 939 & n.108 (citing, as examples, four district court 
decisions: Am. Network, Inc. v. Access Am.lConnect Atlanta, Inc., 975 F. Supp. 494, 
498-99 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Superguide Corp. v. Kegan, 987 F. SUpp. 481, 486 (W.D.N.C. 
1997); Heroes, Inc., 958 F. Supp. at 4-5; Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 
1328, 1333 (E.D. Mo. 1996». 
109. Global Cyberspace Jurisdiction Report, supra note 1, at 47-48. 
110. See CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1263-64 (6th Cir. 1996). 
111. Id. at 1260-61. 
112. Id. 
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CompuServe's system for others to buy.113 Although less than $650 
of Patterson's software was actually purchased by Ohio residents, 
the court held that the Buckeye State could assert jurisdiction over 
him because, like the defendant in Burger King, Patterson "know­
ingly made an effort" and, in fact, purposefully contracted "to mar­
ket a product in other states, with Ohio-based CompuServe 
operating, in effect, as his distribution center."114 Targeting, once 
again, ruled the day. 
In fact, a host of personal jurisdiction-Internet cases have suc­
cessfully applied the Burger King-CompuServe paradigm.11s The 
theme of these cases is that intentionally-based, contractual affilia­
tion is a workable methodology for resolving many, if not all, per­
sonal jurisdiction-Internet disputes. 
Finally, targeting remains clearly at the center of those per­
sonal jurisdiction-Internet cases following Calder.116 The most fa­
mous of these is Panavision.117 In Panavision, the California 
owners of the PANAVISION (R) and PANAFLEX (R) marks sued 
an Illinois man who had registered the domain names panavi­
sion.com and panaflex.com in California. us Relying on Calder, the 
Ninth Circuit held that the defendant had manifested an intention 
to do business in California-and was thus subject to personal juris­
diction there-by attempting to extort money from the California 
plaintiffs.119 Like the defendants in Calder, this Illinois cybersquat­
ter knew that the brunt of harm to the plaintiff would be felt in 
California, "the heart of the theatrical motion picture and television 
industry."12o Accordingly, as in Calder, the court found that the 
exercise of jurisdiction over a defendant in California-the targeted 
jurisdiction-was proper.121 
113. Id. 
114. Id. at 1263. 
115. See, e.g., Multi-Tech Sys., Inc. v. VocalTec Communications, Inc., 122 F. 
Supp. 2d 1046, 1050-51 (D. Minn. 2000); Bailey v. Turbine DeSign, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 2d 
790, 793-95 (W.D. Tenn. 2000); Quokka Sports, Inc. v. Cup Int'I Ltd., 99 F. Supp. 2d 
1105,1111-12 (N.D. Cal. 1999); Smith v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 968 F. Supp. 1356, 
1364-65 (W.D. Ark. 1997). 
116. See, e.g., Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta Nat'l, Inc., 223 F.3d 1082, 1088 
(9th Cir. 2000); Bailey, 86 F. Supp. 2d at 796-97; McMaster-Carr Supply Co. v. Supply 
Depot, Inc., No. 98C1903, 1999 WL 417352, at *4 (N.D. III. June 16, 1999). 
117. Pan avis ion Int'l, L.P., v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998). 
118. Id. 
119. Id. at 1321-22. 
120. Id. at 1321. 
121. Id. at 1324. Since Panavision, the Ninth Circuit has intertwined the "some­
thing more" of Asahi with the "intentional conduct" of Calder to describe "[e]xpress 
256 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:237 
B. Related Legal Concepts 
Before proceeding to analyze the District of Massachusetts 
cases, several loose ends should be addressed. This subsection com­
ments briefly on three additional issues: (1) the role of the Eastern 
District of Virginia in the analysis; (2) the Anticybersquatting Con­
sumer Protection Act of 1999 ("ACPA"); and (3) the Global Cyber­
space Jurisdiction Project report's proposed default rules. 
1. A Note on the Eastern District of Virginia 
There is a tempting "solution" to tricky personal jurisdiction­
Internet issues-that is, channeling many federal Internet-based 
cases through the Eastern District of Virginia. The rationale for 
this theory goes something like this: Network Solutions, Inc. 
("NSI") registers most United States-based domain names; NSI is 
located in eastern Virginia; because many web-site disputes involve 
domain names, they touch (however incidentally) on NSI and, in 
turn, the Eastern District of Virginia; ergo, there is personal juris­
diction in the Eastern District of Virginia over any such dispute. 
Indeed, in rem proceedings regarding domain names are already 
being funneled into the Eastern District of Virginia.122 
While superficially appealing, establishing a special Internet 
district in non-in rem cases is a bad idea. First, personal jurisdiction 
in most such cases would be based solely on a standard contract 
with NSI. It is settled, however, at least in the Fourth Circuit, 
where the Eastern District of Virginia sits, that a mere contract be­
tween a forum resident and a non-resident defendant does not pro­
vide sufficient minimum contacts for personal jurisdiction.123 In 
this respect, rejecting the Eastern District of Virginia as a jurisdic­
tional clearinghouse in these type of cases is similar to the near uni­
versal rejection of the District of Columbia District as the forum for 
aiming[:] ... a concept that in the jurisdictional context hardly defines itself ... [yet] is 
satisfied when the defendant is alleged to have engaged in wrongful conduct targeted at 
a plaintiff whom the defendant knows to be a resident of the forum state." Bancroft & 
Masters, Inc., 223 F.3d at 1087. 
122. See, e.g., Caesars World, Inc. v. Caesars-Palace. com, 112 F. Supp. 2d 505 
(E.D. Va. 2000); Heathmount A.E. Corp. v. Technodrome.com, 106 F. Supp. 2d 860 
(E.D. Va. 2000); Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. lucentsucks.com, 95 F. Supp. 2d 528 (E.D. 
Va. 2000). 
123. See Ellicott Mach. Corp. v. John Holland Party Ltd., 995 F.2d 474, 478 (4th 
Cir. 1993); see also Am. Online, Inc. v. Huang, 106 F. Supp. 2d 848, 856 (E.D. Va. 2000) 
(citing Ellicott Mach. and concluding that domain name registration agreements with 
NSI from which plaintiffs' claim arises are insufficient contacts with Virginia for pur­
poses of personal jurisdiction over non-resident defendant). 
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all cases where contact with a federal agency is involved. 124 
Second, domain names are "relatively minor portion[s] of the 
Internet's architecture, and a minuscule presence in [Virginia ]."125 
In the A-B-C lexicon, there is little evidence that the average defen­
dant (in say Florida) who is sued by the average plaintiff (in say 
Massachusetts) over domain name usage purposefully availed her­
self of, or intended to target, Virginia.126 If anything, the Florida 
defendant in this hypothetical is targeting Massachusetts. 
Finally, to paraphrase a recent "government contacts" case, 
"[t]o permit courts to assert personal jurisdiction over nonresidents 
whose sole contact with the [Eastern District of Virginia] consists of 
dealing with [NSI] not only would pose a threat to ... public partic­
ipation in [cyberspace], but also would threaten to convert the 
[Eastern District of Virginia] into a national judicial forum."127 
This practical argument-no matter how much busy docket clerks 
in other parts of the country might disagree-is perhaps the strong­
est reason to avoid the temptation to ship most Internet cases to the 
Eastern District of Virginia. 
2. The ACPA 
The ACPA, which was signed by President Clinton on Novem­
ber 29, 1999,128 targets bad faith registration or use of domain 
names.129 In addition to providing statutory damages (in the tens of 
thousands of dollars) for cybersquatting violations, the ACPA cre­
ates a federal in rem action against domain names,13o However, the 
in rem provisions kick in only after the trademark owner has made 
unsuccessful efforts to identify a forum somewhere in the United 
States that has personal jurisdiction over the registrant. 131 The 
ACPA has already been upheld by some lower courts,132 and, as 
124. See, e.g., Zeneca Ltd. v. Mylan Pharm., Inc., 173 F.3d 829, 831 (Fed. Cir. 
1999); Lamb v. Turbine Design, Inc., 538 S.E.2d 437 (Ga. 2000); Envtl. Research Int'!, 
Inc. v. Lockwood Greene Eng'rs, Inc., 355 A.2d 808, 813 (D.C. 1976). 
125. Am. Online, 106 F. Supp. 2d at 858 (citing Network Solutions, Inc. v. Unbro 
Int'!, Inc., 529 S.E.2d 80, 85 (Va. 2000». 
126. See id. 
127. Zeneca, 173 F.3d at 831 (quoting Envtl. Research, 355 A.2d at 813); accord 
Lamb, 538 S.E.2d at 439. 
128. 15 U.S.c. 1125(d) (2000). 
129. See § 1125(d)(1)(A)(i) & (ii). 
130. § 1125(d)(2)(A). 
131. § 1125(d)(2)(A)(ii). See generally Mark A. Thurmon, Federal Courts and the 
Internet, 2000 WL 23831154 (June 29,2000) (describing ACPA). 
132. See, e.g., Caesars World, Inc. v. Caesars-Palace.com, 112 F. Supp. 2d 505 
(E.D. Va. 2000). 
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indicated, is funneling (for better or for worse) in rem domain dis­
putes to the Eastern District of Virginia.133 
3. 	 The Global Cyberspace Jurisdiction Project report's 
Proposed Default Rules 
In the summer of 2000, the Global Cyberspace Jurisdiction 
Project in its report to the American Bar Association proposed a 
number of "jurisdictional default rules." With regard to personal 
jurisdiction, the report proposes, among other things, the following: 
1.1.1. Every Internet party should be subject to personal ... ju­
risdiction somewhere. In reasonable circumstances, more than 
one state may be able to assert ... personal ... jurisdiction in 
electronic commerce transactions, as they have historically in 
physical transactions. 
1.1.2. Personal ... jurisdiction should not be asserted based 
solely on the accessibility in the state of a passive web site that 
does not target the state. 
1.1.3.... [P]ersonal ... jurisdiction should be assertable over a 
web site content provider ("sponsor") in a state, assuming there 
is no enforceable contractual choice of law and forum, if: 
1.1.3(a). the sponsor is a habitual resident of that state or has its 
principal place of business in that state; 
1.1.3(b). the sponsor targets that state and the claim arises out of 
the content of the site; or 
1.1.3(c). a dispute arises out of a transaction generated through a 
web site or service that does not target any specific state, but is 
interactive and can be fairly considered knowingly to engage in 
business transactions there .134 
As can be seen from the emphasized portions, the report relies 
heavily on targeting and intentional conduct as guiding principles. 
In this respect, the report also states that while a global definition 
of "targeting" needs to be achieved, "[g]enerically, targeting 
should cover technological practices that sponsors use to purpose­
fully avail themselves of the commercial benefits of the targeted 
states. "135 
133. See supra Part n.B.1 for a discussion of the role of the Eastern District of 
Virginia in personal jurisdiction-Internet issues. 
134. Global Cyberspace Jurisdiction Report, supra note 1, at 20-21 (emphasis 
added). 
135. Id. at 21 n.51. 
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C. Summary 
To summarize, the Eastern District of Virginia should not be 
utilized as a catch-all forum for Internet cases, even though the 
ACPA appears to be herding many in rem cases in that direction. 
In addition, Zippo's mathematical adherence to a web-site's activity 
appears to be giving way to a new trend in personal jurisdiction­
Internet cases-a focus on targeting-and the foundation for that 
trend is the A-B-C cases. Indeed, the Global Cyberspace Jurisdic­
tion Project is also looking to targeting as a primary guiding princi­
ple. The next and final section of this Article explores how these 
trends are appearing within the District of Massachusetts. 
III. 	 PERSONAL JURISDICTION AND THE INTERNET WITHIN 
THIS DISTRICT 
One of the few, non-pending personal jurisdiction-Internet de­
cisions from the District of Massachusetts, Hasbro, Inc. v. Clue 
Computing, Inc.,136 adopted Zippo's sliding scale and, as a result, 
emphasized the level of interaction employed by a particular web­
site, over targeting, in determining a personal jurisdiction issueP7 
Luckily, Hasbro and others have also relied, to varying degrees, on 
Asahi, Burger King, or CaiderP8 It is the view of the author that a 
more specific zeroing-in on the "targeting" paradigm might be an 
appropriate next step. In other words, the A-B-Cs of targeting 
should provide a workable formula for resolving most personal ju­
risdiction Internet issues within the District of Massachusetts. 
A. Existing Massachusetts Decisions 
As of this writing, only a handful of non-pending personal ju­
risdiction Internet decisions exist from the District of Massachu­
setts.139 For the most part, these cases are relatively 
straightforward. However, they have not yet been comprehensively 
136. 994 F. Supp. 34 (D. Mass. 1997). 
137. Id. at 39-40, 45. 
138. See, e.g., New Eng. Horsemen's Benevolent & Protective Ass'n, Inc. v. 
Rockingham Ventures, Inc., No. 97-12701, 1999 WL 350653, *4 (D. Mass. Jan. 11,1999); 
Hasbro, 994 F. Supp. at 42; Gary Scott Int'l, Inc. v. Baroudi, 981 F. Supp. 714, 717 (D. 
Mass. 1997); Digital Equip. Corp. v. AltaVista Tech., Inc., 960 F. Supp. 456, 469-70 (D. 
Mass. 1997); see also discussion, infra, regarding New Eng. Horsemen's and Gary Scott. 
139. See supra note 138 for a list of those cases. Interested readers should also 
review a recent personal jurisdiction-Internet decision. Northern Light Tech., Inc. v. 
Northern Lights Club, 97 F. Supp. 2d 96 (D. Mass. 2000), affd, 236 F.3d 57 (1st Cir. 
2001). 
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analyzed within the A-B-C paradigm.140 
In Digital, an early, straightforward case in this district, the 
court held that it had jurisdiction over the California licensee of the 
" AltaVista" trademark in a breach of contract and tort case 
brought by the trademark owner, the Massachusetts-based Digital 
Equipment Corporation.141 Although Digital is important for its 
comprehensive exegesis of the law in this burgeoning area, it had a 
relatively simple framework based primarily on a contract, which 
the parties had voluntarily entered into and which specified that 
Massachusetts law would apply to their transactions.142 Moreover, 
there was evidence that the defendant had made at least three sales 
of software products to Massachusetts residents "in the course of 
and related to its operation of a Web-site."143 Finally, with regard 
to the plaintiff's tort claim of trademark infringement, the court 
found (via a reference to Calder) that the defendant had targeted 
Massachusetts since it knew that the object of its harm, the Digital 
computer company, was located in Massachusetts.144 
Several other Massachusetts federal cases also employ basic 
analyses. In one, a Massachusetts association representing individ­
uals involved in New England's horse racing industry filed a breach 
of contract action in the district court against a New Hampshire 
racetrack.145 In finding that personal jurisdiction existed, the court 
noted that the track maintained an Internet web-site that included 
directions to the track from Boston.146 There were, however, nu­
merous other Massachusetts contacts.147 For example, most of the 
horses that run at the track were stabled in Massachusetts and 
owned by members of the plaintiff's association, a majority of the 
track's vendors were Massachusetts residents, the track had adver­
tised in both the Boston Globe and the Boston area yellow pages, 
and, in fact, the contract at issue involved the track's sending simul­
cast signals to Massachusetts tracks.148 Accordingly, even though 
140. For a cogent summary of several personal jurisdiction-Internet cases within 
this district, see Lawrence H. Reece, III, Personal Jurisdiction and the Internet, 28 MASS. 
L. WKLY. 282 (Oct. 11,1999). 
141. 960 F. Supp. at 472. 
142. See id. at 463-64, 466. 
143. Id. at 464. 
144. Id. at 470. 
145. New Eng. Horsemen's Benevolent & Protective Ass'n v. Rockingham Ven­
tures, Inc., No. 97-12701, 1999 WL 350653, *4 (D. Mass. Jan. 11, 1999). 
146. Id. at *2. 
147. Id. 
148. [d. at *1-2. 
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Asahi's plurality was not mentioned in the opinion, it could clearly 
be viewed as an Internet plus "something more" case. Indeed, the 
court was so persuaded by the extensive contacts of record that it 
took the bold step of concluding that Massachusetts had general 
jurisdiction over the track.149 
Similarly, in a trademark infringement action, the court found 
that Internet advertising, in addition to a plethora of other forms of 
direct contact to the state, provided ample basis for the court to 
assert personal jurisdiction over the non-resident defendant.15o Ex­
amples of other types of direct state contact included the defen­
dant's making a dozen sales of his allegedly infringing product 
(humidors) in Massachusetts, as well as his planning to sell a large 
number of humidors to a pharmacy chain that had stores in Massa­
chusetts.151 As in New England Horsemen's, the court's conclusion 
could be justified by the Asahi "something-more" plurality. The 
court, however, cited Burger King and stated that in choosing "to 
market and sell his humidors nationwide[,] ... [the] defendant ac­
cepted both the benefits and the risks of nationwide business."152 
A simple reference to Calder might have also sufficed. 
These straightforward cases notwithstanding, the final District 
of Massachusetts case discussed in this section, Hasbro,153 while 
factually complex, also demonstrates the value of the A-B-C para­
digm. The plaintiff in Hasbro was the well-known toy company 
that has its largest facility in Massachusetts.154 It manufactures the 
"Clue" board game and other Clue-game products.155 The defen­
dant, Clue Computing, was a small Colorado computer consulting 
company that had registered the "clue.com" domain name.156 It 
had chosen the name "Clue" as a joking reference to the intelli­
gence of its founders; i.e., unlike others who are "clueless," they 
had a clue.157 According to the court, Clue Computing had served 
less than a dozen clients during its existence and had never gar­
149. Id. This is not to suggest that New Eng. Horsemen's is factually on par with 
Mieczkowski, the Eastern District of Texas case which, as indicated, has been criticized 
for its general jurisdiction-Internet hypothesis. See supra notes 21-23. Rather, New 
Eng. Horsemen's is a penultimate example of a defendant's carrying on in Massachu­
setts "a continuous and systematic presence." 
150. Gary Scott Int') v. Baroudi, 981 F. Supp. 714, 716-17 (D. Mass. 1997). 
151. Id. 
152. Id. at 717. 
153. 994 F. Supp. 34 (D. Mass. 1997). 
154. Id. at 38. 
155. Id. 
156. Id. at 37-38. 
157. Id. at 37 n.1. 
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nered more than $80,000 to $100,000 in annual revenues.158 Unfor­
tunately for the company, however, it had a fairly interactive web-. 
site which allowed visitors to submit email instantly, as well as ad­
vertised the company as a global business that could provide ser­
vices "anywhere on the planet."159 The web-site also boasted that 
the company had provided services (albeit through another entity) 
to Digital Equipment Corp., the Massachusetts-based computer 
company.160 Accordingly, the court held that personal jurisdiction 
over the defendant was appropriate.161 
Hasbro, perhaps, approaches the outer borders of what will 
justify personal jurisdiction in Internet cases within this district. It 
also demonstrates an inherent problem with trying to operate a 
small, cyber-business with a goal of marketing around the globe.162 
In doing so, one runs the risk of being subjected to personal juris­
diction in many different fora. This was so in Hasbro even though, 
as the First Circuit recently recognized, there is "very little similar­
ity between Hasbro's products and services and those of Clue 
Computing."163 
Still, the case makes complete sense, when one views it in light 
of the A-B-C paradigm. First, in accordance with the Asahi plural­
ity, "something more" than the placement of the defendant's ser­
vices into the stream of commerce was involved; the defendant had 
created an association with a company doing business in Massachu­
setts and employed an interactive web-site.164 Second, that alliance 
was an intentional, contract-based relationship which linked it to 
another business within Massachusetts, arguably similar to the rela­
tionship at issue in Burger King .165 Third, and perhaps most impor­
tantly, through the association, the defendant-like the National 
Enquirer editor and author in Calder-had targeted Digital, which 
the defendant knew was a Massachusetts entity and under whose 
accounts the defendant's employee had traveled.166 In fact, the 
158. Id. at 37. 
159. [d. at 38. 
160. [d. at 37-38. 
161. [d. at 46. 
162. As the court acknowledged, no one from Clue Computing had ever traveled 
to Massachusetts, it had only one full-time employee, and it had made only eight calls to 
the state. [d. at 37-38. 
163. Hasbro, Inc. v. Clue Computing, Inc., 232 F.3d 1,2 (1st CiT. 2000). Thus, the 
First Circuit ultimately upheld judgment in favor of Clue Computing on Hasbro's in­
fringement and dilution claims. [d. at 3. 
164. Hasbro, 994 F. Supp. at 45. 
165. See id. at 37-38, 44. 
166. See id. at 37-38. 
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court pointed out that the defendant's work for Digital comprised, 
in effect, one-third to one-half of the defendant's 1995 income.167 
Even though Hasbro relies heavily on Zippo, the first personal ju­
risdiction-Internet case it cites,168 in the final analysis it represents a 
successful utilization of the A-B-C approach. 
B. Where to Go Next? 
The above decisions from the District of Massachusetts indi­
cate that these complex jurisdictional issues should, as always, be 
resolved in a case-by-case manner. Because the facts of each case 
differ, the courts are prudently wary of adopting an all-or-nothing 
approach. Nevertheless, the Massachusetts decisions appear to be 
concentrating on the A-B-Cs of targeting. Such continued empha­
sis would be a proper evolution of personal jurisdiction-Internet is­
sues within the District of Massachusetts. 
CONCLUSION 
As with just about everything in cyberspace, legal issues involv­
ing personal jurisdiction and the Internet are exploding at 
breakneck speed. What happens next year (or next week) can 
make today's news obsolete. For example, at the end of 1996, only 
40 million English speakers and 10 million non-English speakers 
were on-line.169 By the end of 2000, those figures had grown to 
approximately 192 million and 211 million, respectivelypO and, by 
2005, estimates show that about 320 million English speakers and 
820 million non-English speakers will be using the Internet.171 
Despite this rapid evolution, the Supreme Court's fundamental 
focus on targeting provides a staid template for resolving personal 
jurisdiction-Internet issues within the District of Massachusetts. To 
be sure, one should keep a wary eye on the expansion of legislation, 
such as the ACPA or other "default rules," which might alter the 
landscape significantly. However, adherence to the A-B-Cs of 
167. Id. at 45. 
168. See id. at 39-40 (summarizing Zippo's web-site interactivity analysis). But 
see Millennium Enters. v. Millenium Music, L.P., 33 F. Supp. 2d 907, 922 (D. Or. 1999) 
(declining to adopt Hasbro's reasoning). 
169. Global Reach, Evolution & Projections of Online Linguistic Populations at 
http://glreach.comlglobstats/evol.html (last revised Mar. 18, 2001). 
170. Global, http://glreach.com/globstats/evol.html. 
171. Global, http://glreach.comlglobstats/evol.html. Figures such as these-which 
indicate that non-English Internet growth is far out-pacing English Internet growth­
point to the need for world-wide proposals such as those outlined in the Global Cyber­
space Jurisdiction Report. 
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targeting should allow one practicing in the Commonwealth's fed­
eral courts to resolve most personal jurisdiction-Internet problems 
that may arise. In any event, the technological and legal evolution 
should be fun to watch. 
